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Executive Summary
Special purpose entities, or Public Authorities, constitute a substantial portion of
the public sector. In Kentucky, these entities provide large percentages of the services
offered by state and local governments, employ thousands, have immense budgets, and
issue large quantities of debt. It is this debt issuance that may be of concern to public
administrators.
The purpose of this study was to examine the numbers and types of Authorities
operating in a selection of Kentucky municipalities and how these Authorities, combined
with other possible determinants, affect the levels of aggregate debt in the jurisdictions.
A combination of analytical methods demonstrated that while some of the proposed
determinants, such as tax revenue and population density, did appear to affect the levels
of aggregate debt, the presence of autonomous Public Authorities was seemingly
inconsequential. According to this study, autonomous Public Authorities do not affect
the levels of aggregate debt in Kentucky's cities. Finally, the study demonstrates that the
lack of transparency of information regarding these public entities operating in
Kentucky's cities may be a cause for concern.
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Municipal governments throughout Kentucky, like states and cities across the
country, have turned increasingly to the use of special purpose entities, or Public
Authorities, to finance and administer public projects and services. There is considerable
debate among scholars, administrators, and officers regarding the true purpose of special
purpose entities. Some argue that they are often better suited for specific purposes than is
the traditional model of government. Others argue that they are simply vehicles for debt.
A case can be made for either point of view.
Though the nature and even the identities of special purpose entities in the public
sector can be ambiguous, one thing is certain. They do, in general, issue debt and often
do so in very large amounts. Even though the statutory obligation of debt is shifted from
the government to the Authority in such cases, financial mismanagement of and,
particularly, excessive debt issuance by Authorities can be costly and damaging to the
creator government.
It is difficult to measure how much debt is too much, particularly when dealing
with Authorities that, while legally separate, are inextricably linked to their parent
governments. Currently, Kentucky's municipalities have Authorities operating within
their boundaries and often have little control over the debt issuance of those entities. The
Authorities are granted varying degrees of freedom in their own financial affairs and it is
difficult to predict the long-term affects this may have on the individual governments.
Moreover, there is very little transparency regarding the financial activities of
Authorities, as they do not always have to report budgets or have debt issues approved by
the creator governments. The public is generally not familiar with the activities of
Authorities and, sometimes, the parent government has little knowledge of or control
over the financial affairs of the entities. The result is that Authorities operate in a realm
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largely obscured form our vision but have the capacity to severely affect the financial
position of local governments.
To understand the effects that the financial activities of Public Authorities may
have on their creators, it is useful to first look to the relationship between Authorities and
the aggregate debt of a municipality. If Authorities are issuing large or excessive
amounts of debt in Kentucky's communities, as some have argued they are prone to do,
we would expect to see larger quantities of aggregate debt in municipalities with more
loosely controlled Authorities. If this is the case, that Authorities or the lack of control
over Authorities is associated with increased aggregate debt, there is cause for concern.
The purpose of this study is to identify and categorize the special purpose entities
operating in a selection of Kentucky cities and determine if they or a combination of
other factors are influencing the debt issuance in the jurisdiction. If there seems to be no
association between Authorities and high debt, there is little cause for concern and
municipalities should feel safe in the continued use of Authorities as service providers
and financial vehicles. If, however, we find that there is some relationship between the
use of Authorities, particularly with regard to their autonomy, and increased levels of
aggregate debt, we must then more closely examine the safe use of special purpose
entities.
The following study is a background of Public Authorities in the United States, an
examination of the numbers and natures of Authorities in Kentucky cities, and an
evaluation of Authorities in conjunction with other factors as determinants of aggregate
debt.
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Background
Since the creation of the Port Authority of New York in 1921, Public Authorities
have emerged as increasingly large and important components of state and local
governments. These entities, often identified as special districts, public corporations,
special purpose entities, or public authorities, have grown at an impressive rate in the less
than one century since they appeared in American government. The growth of Public
Authorities has vastly outpaced the growth of their state and local parent governments in
terms of number of entities, personnel, and budgets. (Eger, 2000) Along with this
measurable expansion in size has come a quite accelerated rate of debt issuance. Public
Authorities, by whatever names they may be identified, have for some time outpaced the
debt financing of their parent governments in terms of number of issues, frequency of
issues, and total debt outstanding. (Mitchell, 1996) Quite simply, the number and size of
tax-exempt securities issued by Public Authorities is growing far faster than those of
traditional state and local government entities.
As Public Authorities increase in size and number the general question is begged,
is this a safe, practical, and acceptable alternative to the provision of public goods
through traditional forms of government? A strong case can be made for the use of Public
Authorities on the grounds that their focused mission and assumed expertise, along with
their independent financial characteristics make them ideal for certain purposes. We may
concede that in many instances the special nature of Authorities make them excellent
purveyors of public goods and that, in addition, their independent financial structures
make them easier to monitor and evaluate than traditional governmental organizations.
Moreover, they certainly allow governments to undertake desirable projects that might
not otherwise be feasible due to financial, statutory, or constitutional constraints.
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However, the latter of these two advantages of Public Authorities might also be viewed
as a potential drawback.
Across the United States, it is difficult to predict the effects of the financial
activities of Public Authorities on their parent governments and constituents. There have
been a few instances in which the license of special purpose entities to issue debt has
resulted in over-extension and, sometimes, default or financial collapse. In such cases, the
creator governments are inevitably left to pick up the pieces. There are a number of
forces that could act to create such a situation, from internal mismanagement to outside
influences.
It is important then, that governments create these special purpose entities with
this in mind and make every attempt to ensure the stability and success of the entity.
There are a number of steps governments can take to try to promote the financial
responsibility of Public Authorities and they are usually established with the Authority's
creation. (Leigland, 1994) Even though Authorities exist independently, their creators
often impose restrictions and checks from their inceptions. Their activities can be subject
to executive review or veto, legislative approval, or any other controls the creator
governments wish to embed. There are no set guidelines for establishing these controls
and governments have proved to be diverse and creative in their establishing of special
purpose entities, with a variety of structures and widely ranging levels of autonomy.
In light of the variety of structures and degrees of autonomy found in Public
Authorities, scholars have devoted considerable effort to characterizing and categorizing
these entities as well as assessing their effectiveness in carrying out their stated
objectives. Through these efforts, we have come to better understand the complex nature
and existence of the many types of special purpose entities operating in the United States.
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However, it remains difficult to predict whether the financial activities of
Authorities will have any negative effects on their creator governments. The independent
status of special purpose entities certainly shifts the statutory financial obligation off the
creator government. It is not difficult, however, to understand the responsibility that still
remains with the parent government even after the responsibility has been legally shifted
to the Authority. In fact, one of the most common concerns expressed by interviewees in
the course of this study was that, while the there is sometimes no statutory obligation on
the part of the creator government for the debt incurred by special purpose entities,
implicit obligations remain and are quite real. Implicit obligations, refers to the
understanding that, in the event of the failure of special purpose entity, the parent
government will be responsible in the eyes of the public to restore stability and an
acceptable level of service.
Herein is the potential problem with Public Authorities. They are created to be
separate entities in many ways and, most importantly, are legally separate financial
entities. However, they remain inextricably linked to their creator governments. This
poses a potential problem when governments create Authorities that are autonomous to
varying degrees. Governments often create special purpose entities with the authority to
issue debt. While this debt is many times not the statutory obligation of the parent
government, the government will bear the burden in numerous ways if the Authority
should default or collapse. The government will be forced to endure public outrage while
attempting to devise an alternative source of providing whatever good was the mission of
the failed Authority. This is the implicit obligation of the creator government.
The prominent cities of Kentucky are certainly representative of this scenario.
Each of the Commonwealth's major cities has within it entities that can accurately be
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described as Public Authorities. Each city has created each of these entities with a
different structure and degree of autonomy. Authorities across Kentucky are, as
elsewhere, responsible for a range of public services and goods and comprise a
substantial portion of the public sector. As Kentucky's major cities are in a similar
position with regard to special purpose entities as the rest of the nation, similar potential
problems loom. While the special purpose entities are legally separate, their financial
activities could possibly have a negative impact on the municipal governments.
It is difficult to measure the potential for harm posed by special purpose entities
and there are a number of ways one might approach this problem. One option is to
examine the relationship between special purpose entities and the aggregate debt, or the
sum of public entity-held debt in a jurisdiction. By first establishing the characteristics
and levels of autonomy of special purpose entities in each city, then attempting to
determine if this autonomy has any correlation with abnormal or accelerated debt
issuance, we might determine how Public Authorities are and may continue to affect the
financial positions of creator governments. Currently, it is difficult to tell if Kentucky's
major cities have created Public Authorities whose operations may have adverse effects
on their creator governments. By realizing the nature of these Authorities and their levels
of financial autonomy, as well as any effects of these entities on increased aggregate debt,
we might better understand whether Kentucky's Public Authorities are acting in manners
that might negatively affect their parent governments.
Discussion of Terminology and Definitions
Aggregate Debt
Aggregate debt is the sum of all public debt in a given jurisdiction. This is an
important but often overlooked figure that provides some insight into the overall position
9

of public entities in a city or region. When examining the financial positions of local
governments, we typically focus only on the debt issued and held by the traditional
government itself. The outstanding debt of a local government, as reported in
Comprehensive Annual Financial Statements or other such documents, generally consists
only of the debt for which that entity is directly obligated. This often includes GO debt,
revenue bonds and other direct issues, as well as the issues of entities listed as component
units. This figure is useful in understanding the financial position of the entity but it is
usually only a small fraction of the aggregate public debt in a jurisdiction.
Defining and Characterizing Public Authorities
Public Authorities, used interchangeably with special purpose entities in this work
as an umbrella term to describe a number of categories of public entities whose
characteristics will be discussed hereinafter, possess a number of general traits that make
them attractive alternatives to traditional governmental agencies. First, Authorities are
often created with the assumption that their independent status, in that they are legally
separate from their parent governments, will insulate them from the political concerns
that sometimes interfere with optimal policy in traditional governmental entities. In other
words, the creators of Public Authorities often hope that the legal separation of the
entities from the government and its political affiliates will allow the Authorities to act
solely in pursuit of their stated objectives.
Second, in addition to the insulation from political concerns, Public Authorities
are often created to take advantage of the presumed benefits of governance by a single or
narrowed purpose entity. The hope is that, in addition to minimizing the influence of
politics, Authorities may minimize the influence of competing policy objectives. In
traditional governmental organizations, the variety of objectives commonly place projects

10

and initiatives in competition for time, attention, and funding. This is not so prevalent an
issue within single or narrow purpose Authorities. They are usually designed with a
single or a narrow set of objectives in mind, and thus, they are not generally subject to the
policy rivalry associated with traditional governments.
Another potential benefit derived from the creation of a special purpose Authority
is the level of expertise that may arise from its specified objectives. The assumption is
that, given its narrow interests, a Public Authority will develop a level of specialization
and expertise within its ranks largely foreign to traditional state and local agencies or
divisions.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Public Authorities are created as vehicles
for funding. Notional and statutory limitations, both externally and internally imposed,
limit the debt financing activities of state and local governments. Whether in the form of
state imposed limitations on municipalities, self imposed ceilings, or a perceived lack of
approval from constituents, there are myriad regulating forces affecting the debt
financing of state and municipal governments. Whether the ceilings are definite, such as a
dollar amount or percentage, or notional, vague, or otherwise non-specific, their effects
are noticeable. When traditional governments wish to avoid the direct burden of
additional debt financing or skirt internally or externally imposed restrictions, they
commonly turn to the creation of Public Authorities. Using Authorities as financing
vehicles may allow governments to fund necessary or desirable projects without incurring
the direct, legal obligation of additional debt. The popularity of these independent entities
has grown substantially since the creation of the Port Authority of New York and Public
Authorities have emerged as a large and rapidly expanding facet of state and local
government.
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Several scholars have devoted their time to the study of special purpose public
entities and most have found that one of the most glaring difficulties inherent in the
endeavor is that of identification and classification. A section devoted to relevant and
important research in the field will follow. First, however, it is necessary to briefly
discuss the terminology and categorization used herein. As mentioned earlier, the term
Public Authority will be used liberally in this analysis as an umbrella term to describe
entities that are created by governments to serve public interests, but which maintain a
legally separate status. Borrowing from the work of Robert Eger, discussed in more detail
later, Public Authorities can be divided into the subcategories special districts,
government corporations, and public authorities. Again, Eger's contribution to the study
of these entities will be discussed later but, for now, it is sufficient to mention that the
proper term Public Authority (capitalized) is divisible into the aforementioned subcategories. This is the basic categorization used in this analysis and is illustrated in
Appendix A. Such entities are government creatures and are similar to the government in
their purposes. However, they are separated by varying degrees from their creators.
Typically, the structures of Public Authorities make them distinct from the
traditional models of government and often more similar to a corporate structure. They
are usually governed by a board of some sort, a type of board of directors, consisting of
some combination of members of the business community, government officials, exofficio, and representatives from interested organizations. (Eger, 2000) While the
makeup of governing boards can vary from one Authority to another, they are generally
representative of the aforementioned categories of members. Boards are often appointed
by policy makers but in many cases, are not legally subject to the creator government.
Hence, board members may come to their positions through the government but their
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official role is to serve only the mission of the Authority.
In a manner similar to private corporations, Public Authorities usually hire
executive officers to serve at the pleasure of the board. These executives are often
professionals with experience or expertise in a related business or experienced public
sector executives. These executives are, in turn, responsible for the daily operations of the
entity and its operational and personnel activities. In this respect, Authorities are quite
similar to private firms. The executive officers are responsible to the board but do not
generally have any direct political ties or obligations.
Another common aspect of entities that may be characterized as Public
Authorities is that their financial activities are usually independent of those of their parent
governments. Some Public Authorities, such as school districts, fall into the category of
special districts and may have the authority to levy taxes separate from those imposed by
the parent government. In such cases, however, the entity is often directly subject to the
approval of the population through measures like elected boards and referendums. The
focus of this analysis is, on the other hand, those Authorities that do not have direct
subjugation to the voters and who finance their activities by vehicles other than taxation.
The most popular vehicle for finance in such entities, and the primary subject of this
study, is the issuance of debt in the form of bonds. As mentioned earlier, many
Authorities are created largely for their abilities to fund projects without affecting the
direct or explicit debt obligations of their parent governments. Hence, a very common
characteristic of those entities that may be described as Public Authorities is the authority
to issue public debt. These are by no means the only characteristics of Public Authorities,
nor do all Authorities fit these characteristics, but these descriptions are important
identifiers for understanding the basic umbrella term of Public Authorities.
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Study Overview
There are myriad entities across the United States that seem to fit the description
of a Public Authority. However, the task of identifying and categorizing these bodies is a
daunting one. There is no universally accepted set of characteristics common to all Public
Authorities and they can have as many different structures, purposes, and activities as
they have different names. Moreover, there are no recognized information repositories for
the existence or activities of these entities. As a result, Public Authorities maintain a sort
of anonymity in the public realm and often operate outside the direct scrutiny of the
public eye.
The identification problem in dealing with Public Authorities is, on one hand, one
of the most compelling aspects of their study and, on the other, one of the field's most
notable drawbacks. It is quite difficult to obtain the information necessary to identify
Authorities and determine into which sub-categories of the umbrella term they may fall
and, accordingly, equally difficult to collect the data required to analyze the financial
impacts of their activities. In fact, I was surprised to learn how many of the government
officials contacted for this study were not familiar with the term Authority and how
many, following its basic explanation, had little knowledge of the existence or activities
of such entities within their jurisdictions. A great many of those contacted for this
analysis could provide only lists of entities, some qualifying as Authorities and some not,
and little more. They often had little to no understanding of the financial activities of
these bodies, their legal status with regard to the creator governments, or their levels of
autonomy or subservience to those governments.
Despite the difficulties associated with studying Public Authorities, it is my hope
that this analysis may help us better understand the nature of Public Authorities in
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selected Kentucky cities and their impacts upon aggregate debt. The goal of this study
was to first identify those public bodies that qualify under the umbrella term of Public
Authorities. Second, it was necessary to place these Authorities into sub-categories for
the purpose of examining their debt financing activities. Next, data related to financial
activities were collected from the Public Authorities identified in the selected cities along
with data from the cities themselves. The data were then analyzed to determine the
effects of Authorities and other possible variables on aggregate debt.
This study contains a few distinct sections, the first of which is a history of Public
Authorities in the United States. Following the history will be a discussion of the relevant
literature that laid the groundwork for this analysis. Next is a section outlining the design,
data collection methods, and tools of analysis used in the study as well as any threats to
validity. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis, including the statistical
results and other empirical findings as well as a discussion of these results and their
interpretation. Finally, the last section includes some conclusions drawn from the analysis
along with a discussion of the necessity for further examination.

History
Through the Roosevelt Era
The first recognized Public Authority arose with the 1857 creation of the Mersey
Docks and Harbor Act, by which the British established the Mercey Docks and Harbor
Board. This act is credited with creating the first special purpose entity or Public
Authority, known as the Port of London Authority. (Eger, 2000)
In 1921, Public Authorities emerged in the United States with the Port of New
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York Authority, since 1972 known as Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
(Mitchell, 1996) This special purpose entity was created in response to the economic
competition between the two states for which it is now known. In the early twentieth
century, the shipping industry in and around New York Harbor was chaotic and intense,
as was the competition between New York and New Jersey to realize its benefits. The
turmoil between the states came to a head over the issue of the transcontinental railroads,
on which the local and national economies were heavily dependent. At the time, the
railroads terminated in New Jersey and passengers and cargo bound for New York City
had to board ferries for transportation over the Hudson River. During this period, the
cities on either side of the river owned and operated the piers and the competition for the
railroad freight resulted in an inefficient mess of delays and high costs. (Eger, 2000) To
compound the tension, railroads paid a single price for shipping to New Jersey or New
York, regardless of the high price of traversing the river. This led the State of New Jersey
to file a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission claiming that the single
price was discriminatory. New Jersey's complaint was heard and rejected.
In 1921, five years after the Interstate Commerce disagreed with New Jersey's
complaint of price discrimination, the legislatures of both states approved the creation of
a bi-state port authority to improve and manage the transportation systems in the area.
(Eger, 2000) The authority was charged with the improvement of the area within a
twenty-five mile perimeter of the Statue of Liberty. It was given the authority to levy fees
and charges and was established legally separate and independent from its parent
governments. That independence meant the Authority had autonomy in managing its own
financial activities, purchasing and development, and personnel decisions. The creator
governments did, however, retain authority to subject the financial and managerial
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policies of the Authority, as reflected in its minutes, to the approval of the Governors of
both states. As with many modern Public Authorities, this placed the Port Authority in a
somewhat ambiguously autonomous position; separate and independent from the creator
government(s) but still to some degree linked.
This was the first and, for a brief period, the only modern Public Authority in the
United States. However, due largely to its effectiveness in dealing with the complex
transportation problems in the Harbor, it was not the only such entity for long. The
United States had its first glimpse of the potential advantages of an autonomous special
purpose entity. The Port Authority's singular and focused purpose, its assumed expertise,
and its freedom from the budgetary and political constraints of its creator governments
enabled the new entity to untangle and improve a complex situation fraught with
economic and political competition. While the Port Authority was not a perfect solution
to the chaos of the Harbor, it substantially improved efficiency and served to relieve a
great deal of the pressure between the two states as well as the other interested parties.
(Eger, 2000) As a result of this success, the popularity of Public Authorities grew and
other such special purpose entities began to appear shortly thereafter.
The growth of Public authorities continued throughout the 1930's with such
notable entities as the New York State Power Authority, created to harness hydroelectric
energy from the St. Lawrence River for the provision of power to the state. (Eger, 2000)
Concurrently, the height of the Great Depression did a great deal to spur the growth of
Public Authorities. At a time when many public agencies were ill-equipped to address the
economic failings, unemployment, and foreclosures brought on by the depression,
government corporations, a form of modern Public Authority, offered an attractive
solution. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal included the creation of
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numerous Authorities, largely as public works projects to address the staggering
unemployment. Some of the more notable of the New Deal Authorities were the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Public
Works Administration. (Axlerod, 1992) These types of entities were largely favored over
traditional models of government for their financial autonomy, making them more ideal
for accurate financial analysis and performance evaluation, freedom from political
constraints, and focused missions.
In addition to creating numerous Federal Authorities, Roosevelt's New Deal
policies also strongly promoted the use of public corporations by state and local
governments. (Eger, 2000) The Roosevelt Administration believed that the states could
benefit from public corporations for the same reasons as the Federal Government.
Moreover, Roosevelt urged states to use Authorities to circumvent budgetary and debt
limitations. As a result of the previous successes of Public Authorities as well as the
promotion on their behalf by the Roosevelt Administration, state and local governments
created hundreds of these entities throughout the 1930's. (Eger, 2000) They were created
in large part to provide utilities such as water, sewer, and electrical systems. However,
they were also created to address other public issues such as housing and economic
development.
It was during this time of great growth for Public Authorities that some of these
entities began to exhibit their potential drawbacks. All Authorities were created with
limitations, and many with sunsets, to their activities and their perpetuation. However, in
the face of these limitations, a few particularly effective executives of public corporations
went to great lengths to perpetuate and expand their organizations and, thus, their
positions. The most notable example of this empire building is that of Robert Moses and
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the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, whose sunset was to coincide with the
retirement of the entity's outstanding revenue bonds. Moses, seeing the writing of his
elimination on the wall, prolonged the existence of his organization by extending the
activities of the Authority well beyond its original purpose and including caveats in the
bond covenants protecting his own powers. In fact, Moses was so effective in this pursuit
that his reign did not end until 1967, when his Authority was merged with the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. This is an early and important example of the
potential problems that may arise with autonomous nature of Public Authorities and is
one of the instances that led to this study. This occurrence demonstrates that the very
autonomy that makes authorities effective purveyors of public goods may also be an
inherent danger, as the entities grow to a position and scope beyond the intent of their
parent governments. (Axlerod, 1992)
When the Second World War reached the United States in 1941, governments
again turned to the then decades-old practice of using special purpose entities to address
specific public needs. As private firms were slow to respond to the need for wartime
production, the Roosevelt Administration again intervened to create special purpose
entities. These entities were created to produce and distribute wartime materials and spur
the transition from a peacetime to a wartime economy. They ran factories and logistics,
often in conjunction with or managed entirely by representatives from the private sector.
These Authorities were instrumental in the Pacific naval buildup as well as Lend Lease
and the massing of supplies in the European theater. Again, Public Authorities proved to
be quite adept at addressing specific public needs, particularly in light of time constraints
when traditional government agencies are notoriously slow to act.
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The Post-Roosevelt Era to 1960
In the wake of World War Two, all levels of government stood face to face with
the neglect of domestic projects arising from their all-out concentration on the war effort.
The nation's infrastructure was being utilized at full capacity and was in desperate need of
expansion and improvement. Bridges, roads, and tunnels were often insufficient or in a
state of disrepair. (Axlerod, 1992) In addition, water and sewer systems across the
country were barely, if at all, meeting the needs of the rapidly growing and increasingly
mobile population. The transition of the United States away from reliance on mass
transportation to a nation of personal motorists exacerbated these concerns. Roadways
were insufficient to handle the exponential growth of automobile traffic and,
concurrently, automobiles were enabling people to move away from metropolitan areas
and mass transit to new developments in need of infrastructure. (Axlerod, 1992)
At the same time, veterans were returning home to a vastly changed nation and
were searching for educations and employment as well as homes. The pressures of a
growing and mobile population and deteriorating infrastructure left officials in all levels
of government facing difficult decisions regarding the funding of new and desperately
needed projects. (Axlerod, 1992) The prospects of incurring further debt obligations
were largely unattractive. Even more unattractive were prospects of increasing taxes.
Facing these two options, always motivation for creative financing, prompted
governments to again resort to Public Authorities. Across the nation, hundreds of new
special purpose entities were created to provide for new projects without tax increases or
increased debt obligation. (Axlerod, 1992) They were born to create and maintain roads
and bridges, sewer and water systems, provide opportunities for home ownership, and
promote a higher rate of employment. Interestingly, when the expansion of the interstate
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highway system and roadway improvements, all provided by traditional governmental
entities as well as Public Authorities, decimated private mass transit firms, the public
takeovers of the failing firms sparked the creation of more special purpose entities.
AMTRAK and CONRAIL are two examples of pubic corporations that were created to
salvage failing mass transit systems. (Eger, 2000)
At the same time, the nationwide demand for higher education expanded and
public universities were in need of development. They needed to expand campus
facilities, particularly dormitories. Again, special purpose entities, such as dormitory
authorities were used to fund and oversee the necessary expansions. (Eger, 2000) In
addition, Public Authorities were used to provide tuition assistance for the leagues of
incoming new students. (Axlerod, 1992)
In the two decades following the Second World War, governments at all levels
were faced with backlogged domestic projects resulting from the total resource effort
demanded by the war. These immediate needs, along with the reluctance of governments
to increase taxes or incur additional debt obligations, led to the creation of myriad new
special purpose entities and a continuing increase in the scope of government in
American lives.
The 1960's to the Present
In the 1960"s and 1970's, public distrust of the government grew exponentially.
Increasingly during this period, the public viewed the government as too powerful and
too wasteful. In the midst of social upheaval and cultural revolution, there was a palatable
feeling that the government could not be completely trusted. Exacerbating the problem
for the government, inflation was rampant by the 1970's and taxpayers were increasingly
dissatisfied with the service of their elected, appointed, and hired officials. All of these
21

trends compounded to cause governments nationwide to begin to examine their funding
strategies and enforce financial, statutory, and constitutional constraints. (Axlerod,
1992)With these constraints, Public Authorities continued to carry favor with some
governments for their abilities to circumvent ceilings on debt issuance. However, much
of the public was less than thrilled by use of these entities to incur more debt and many
saw Authorities as another example of the governments growing and oppressive power. It
is difficult to guess how many such entities were created to avoid statutory, constitutional
and budgetary constraints and how many were created to capitalize on the other useful
characteristics. Whatever the reasons for their creation, Authorities born during this these
two decades were viewed largely with suspicion and distrust or "a ploy to beat the
system" (Axlerod, 1992). At the same time, corruption became a centerpiece of public
conversation as scandals involving everyone from local officials to the President of the
United States dominated the news. With specific regard to Public Authorities, special
purpose entities from no less than fifteen states came under investigation during the
1970's for allegations of bribery, extortion, and other various forms of corruption. This
period was a difficult one for all levels of government and Public Authorities were not
immune to the public's general dissatisfaction.
This sense of distrust continued into the 1980's, although it was tempered by
slowed inflation and a recovering economy. (Eger, 2000) The constraints brought on
during the 1960's and 1970's continued as well while governments were facing increasing
demand for improved infrastructure. This climate provided for the continued growth of
Public Authorities, as public sentiment against tax increases and growing budget deficits
coincided with the demand for public projects. (Eger, 2000) Governments again turned
to special purpose entities. Opponents of special purpose entities managed a few small

22

victories during this period, as restrictions were placed on the types of projects that
qualified for funding by tax-exempt securities. (Eger, 2000) However, when the separate
status of special purpose entities was formally challenged, courts at the state and federal
levels repeatedly found them to be legally independent entities.
The nineteen eighties also witnessed the largest collapse of such an entity in
United States history, in the form of the Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS) default, demonstrating the potential harm that may come if a Public Authority
is improperly managed (Leigland and Lamb, 1986). WPPSS was created to build,
operate, and manage electrical power generation and transmission facilities in the State of
Washington. This Authority enjoyed all the benefits of administrative and financial
independence from its creator government, the State, commonly afforded such entities. It
issued debt in large quantities in the form of tax-exempt bonds and, in the summer of
1983, defaulted on $2.5 billion of these obligations. (Leigland and Lamb, 1986)
This default severely damaged the municipal bond market and sparked numerous
lawsuits by lenders in an effort to collect the defaulted obligations from the creator
government. (Eger, 2000) As in other cases, the courts found that WPPSS was legally
separate and that its obligations were its own. The lenders were unable to recover their
losses from the state government. (Leigland and Lamb, 1986) While the State was not
found to be obligated to the lenders in the face of the default, it was not absolved of
responsibility. Washington was left with a power system in disarray, a public whose trust
had been damaged, and the responsibility of restoring both to a suitable level. This is a
very good example of what can happen when a Public Authority is granted autonomy,
operates outside the reach of the public and elected officials, and does so with reckless
negligence. Even though the government was not statutorily obligated for the defaulted
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debt, it was left with the expensive and time-consuming task of undoing the damage done
by the mismanagement of the independent Authority. While this represents the most
extreme scenario, smaller defaults happen from time to time and, in the event an
Authority should collapse altogether, the parent government is left to pick up the pieces.
Today, special purpose entities remain as powerful a force as ever and their
proportion to the rest of the public sector continues to grow. Opponents still claim that
they are created to circumvent funding constraints, that they operate outside the reach of
the public and officials, that their use of tax-exempt securities to generate funds creates
economic inefficiencies, and that these securities are large federal tax expenditures and a
drain on the U.S. Government. Nevertheless, the usefulness of Public Authorities in the
provision of public goods seems to drown out their opponents and the growth of special
purpose entities continues. While their uses have been restricted and they are often
viewed with skepticism, they provide for popular projects that might not otherwise be
feasible or palatable and thus, right or wrong, continue to grow in size and number.

Review of Relevant Literature
This section is a discussion of the works that were instrumental in the
development of this analysis. The following scholars have advanced theories on many
aspects of special purpose entities, ranging from characterization and categorization to
financial and performance evaluation. Each of these scholars has contributed to the study
of special purpose entities and these contributions are outlined hereinafter in the context
of this study.
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James Leigland
In chapter 19 of The Handbook of Municipal Bonds and Public Finance, (Lamb,
et. al., 1993) “Overview of Public Authorities and Special Districts,” Leigland provides a
good and comprehensive understanding of the entities discussed in this study. He
examines the general characteristics of special purpose entities as well as the purposes for
their creation. The general characteristics he identifies largely correspond to those
identified by other scholars and include corporate status, legal separation from the creator
government, independence and flexibility derived from a “business-like” status,
governing boards (usually appointed), and the ability to access private money markets.
He divides special purpose entities into two general categories: public authorities and
special districts. He identifies the common distinctions that special districts, unlike
public authorities, generally have elected rather than appointed boards, are smaller, have
the authority to levy taxes, and do not issue debt. However, Leigland wisely points out
that these generalizations do not always apply. In many states there are entities that blur
these distinctions by demonstrating characteristics that apply to both public authorities
and special districts. Some entities best described as public authorities are authorized to
levy taxes and some special districts issue general obligation or revenue bonds.
Throughout his work, Leigland discusses the roles, scopes, purposes, and characteristics
of these types of entities while demonstrating the difficulty in categorization. He
illustrates a wide variety of uses and structures across the spectrum of special purpose
entities.
While Leigland explains that fitting these entities into specific categories is
problematic, he is able to offer some useful tools for understanding organizations
generally described as special purpose entities. He enumerates a set of advantages and
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disadvantages that helps us better understand the nature of special purpose entities as a
whole. Finally, Leigland offers three conclusions that may derived from the evidence he
presented. First, authorities and districts have been useful purveyors of public goods by
increasing access to the bond market, facilitating timely construction management, and
by providing for administrative and financial arrangements for services across multiple
jurisdictions. They also allow for the circumvention of state and local restrictions
pertaining to financing activities. Second, he concludes that the primary weakness of the
corporate form of government is the tendency of special purpose entities, by any name, to
remain isolated from broader policy planning frameworks. Third, government officials at
all levels need much more complete information on the activities of government
corporations in order to arrive at better and cost-effective decisions regarding their use.
In “Public Authorities and the Determinants of Their Use by State and Local
Governments,” Leigland examines the general concepts associated with special purpose
governments and how they contribute to our understanding of these entities. (Leigland,
1994) He concludes that the public authority concept has drawn attention to the
widespread use of these forms of government but it has not contributed much to our
understanding of why the use of these entities is widespread. In the second part of his
study, Leigland attempts to address this lack of understanding and explain the prevalence
of public authorities. He explains that there are two general rationales for their use.
Supporters claim that public authorities allow for better management in the provision of
public goods and services and promote their businesslike structures. Critics, however,
argue that authorities are simply borrowing machines used to circumvent financing
regulations. Leigland constructs a model for the proliferation of public authorities, using
independent variables to explain the dependent variables, special purpose debt
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outstanding and total number of special purpose governments. His conclusion is that the
ability to raise money, rather than businesslike management, accounts for most of the
popularity of public authorities.
It is in the second part of this study, in which he examined determinants of the use
of Authorities, that Leigland demonstrated some important variables associated with
special purpose entities. His use of these determinants, including population, density, tax
capacity, and intergovernmental revenues, to examine the use of Authorities served as
guidance for the work you currently read. He demonstrated that these variables may
indeed correlate with the use of Public Authorities and, perhaps by extension, the
issuance of debt. This part of Leigland's study was the empirical precedent for this
analysis.
Leigland's work is useful in understanding the general concepts of public
authorities and their characteristics. He illustrates the scope and uses of authorities and
points out advantages and disadvantages. Perhaps most significantly, he demonstrates
that despite the apparent usefulness of the businesslike structure of authorities, the ability
to raise money for projects beyond the financial scope of traditional governments is the
driving force behind their proliferation. This may lead one to question whether or not the
fund-raising capabilities of public authorities open the door for undesirable levels of debt
issuance or other unsound financial management. Moreover, Leigland points out the
need for better and more complete information regarding the activities of public
authorities both for the sake of study and for better public administration. This is a theme
that will be revisited in this study.
R A Cropf, G D Wendel
Cropf and Wendel's article The Determinants of Municipal Debt Policy: a pooled
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time series analysis helped to provide some of the variables for this study. In their study,
the authors analyzed the effects of certain social, political, and economic factors on
municipal debt behavior in a pooled time-series regression model. They found that these
factors increased the cities' reliance upon revenue debt but not on general obligation debt.
They pointed out a prevalent political stance of circumvention, with the cities taking the
issues out of the voters’ hands by turning to revenue debt. While not specifically relevant
to this study, as it does not deal with aggregate debt or Authorities, their work
demonstrated that several determinants of municipal debt can be observed. Namely, they
identified tax revenues and expenditures, population density, and intergovernmental aid
as determinants of debt policy. By extension, we should be able to apply most of the
same determinants to aggregate debt.
Guntram B. Wolff
In Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Causes, Wolff
reinforces some of these determinants of municipal debt. The main purpose of Wolff's
study was to identify two categories of causes leading to fiscal problems in a sample of
900 U.S. Cities. Wolff found that structural problems such as immigration and
congestion were more important to the fiscal crises than were non-structural causes such
as weak mayors and union power. While this is not particularly important to the work
you currently read, Wolff's examined debt issuance, particularly excessive debt, as a
contributor to fiscal crisis in the cities. In so doing, the author presented several possible
variables to explain debt issuance. Among these were income, tax revenue, expenditures,
population, population growth, population density, and intergovernmental aid. This
serves to reinforce the use of these proposed determinants for the present study.
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Jerry Mitchell
Mitchell's work reminds us of the inherent difficulties with trying to evaluate the
effects of special purpose entities or trying to characterize them or their effects as "good"
or "bad." As Mitchell readily points out, there are so many types of Authorities and
opinions regarding what these entities should do, how they should behave, and what roles
they should play, it is difficult to make general assertions about them as a group.
(Mitchell, 1996) He discusses the usefulness as well as the drawbacks in the course of
addressing the general characteristics of Public Authorities. The discussion provides an
ideal background for the research of special purpose entities, as he dwells on the nature
and roles of Public Authorities, the reasons for their use, their origins and history, and,
most importantly for this study, issues related to public debt. Mitchell discusses types of
special purpose entity debt and some of the mechanics of its issuance, as well as
influences on Authorities and issues of performance evaluation.
Perhaps his contribution of greatest relevance to this work is found in Public
Authorities and Government Debt: Practices and Issues (1996). In this article, Mitchell
identifies often latent problems with Public Authorities, aside from the difficulty of
characterization and evaluation in general. The three problems identified in his work are
defaults, reliance on intergovernmental subsidies, and "out of control" debt financing.
The defaults, suggests Mitchell, may be occurring with growing frequency as special
purpose entities are issuing bonds backed by revenue streams that are increasingly
uncertain or elastic. The second issue Mitchell suggests is that Authorities may be
becoming increasingly reliant upon intergovernmental subsidies. Not only would this be
financially difficult for Authorities, having to make ends meet with the help of subsidies,
but it would denigrate the purpose for creating Authorities in the first place. An Authority
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that relies heavily upon intergovernmental subsidies diminishes the very independence
and autonomy that make it an attractive alternative to traditional governmental models.
Finally, Mitchell addresses concerns that the debt financing activities of some
Authorities may be out of control. He presents some evidence to that effect as well as
statistics showing special purpose entity debt rising far more rapidly than the debt of
traditional government entities. Mitchell also suggests that Authorities may be
diversifying their activities and overextending debt in an effort of self preservation, or to
perpetuate the existence of the entity. All of these factors, he contends, may combine to
suggest that Authorities are issuing irresponsible levels of debt. However, he cautions us
about making general assertions about Authorities. It is difficult to tell, he notes, how
many and which Authorities are issuing responsible levels of debt. A few instances of
reckless mismanagement, he warns, may not be enough to indict the genre for being out
of control. Mitchell, however, does advance some suggestions ranging from simply
reforming of Authorities to eliminating certain Authorities altogether. Again, what we
draw from this part of his work is that there is no universal definition or set of
characteristics for Authorities and is, hence, no universal tool for evaluating them or
correcting for those that have gone awry.
Robert J. Eger III
Bob Eger’s 2000 dissertation on Public Authorities was instrumental in devising
this study. He examines the broad concept of Public Authorities and their functions in
state and local governments. It is from Eger’s dissertation that this study borrows the
nomenclature special purpose entity, used interchangeably with Public Authority as an
umbrella term to describe the types of public, corporate entities examined herein. This
categorization is demonstrated in Appendix A.
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Eger’s dissertation also provides the three subcategories in which these entities
are grouped for study: government corporations, public authorities, and special districts.
He analyzed how special purpose entities are employed by state governments to carry out
a variety of functions, particularly, how they are utilized for financial management. Eger
also contributes a set of characteristics for each of the three subcategories of special
purpose entities, from which this study draws extensively. His differentiation is
demonstrated in Appendix B. Ultimately, Eger concluded from his analysis that there is
evidence of three distinct subcategories of special purpose entities as theorized. He found
that the three types of entities are separated by financial and administrative characteristics
and that these characteristics are instrumental in understanding the nature and functions
of special purpose entities.
This typology was an important first step in this study. It provided a starting point
for the analysis of special purpose entities and established characteristics and categories
for their study. By first differentiating between the types of authorities and their
distinctions, it was then possible to narrow the focus of the study to those entities that
possessed the most autonomous traits. Eger provided the tools and understanding to
distinguish between the groups of special purpose entities and effectively analyze their
activities and the implications of their use.

Design and Validity
There are as many reasons for local governments to create Public Authorities as
there are names for those entities. Whatever the variety of names, structures, or functions
these special purpose entities assume, it seems apparent that generalization of Authorities
for the purpose of study is problematic. As several scholars have demonstrated,
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Authorities differ so often in from and function that it is quite difficult to make any
blanket statements about their activities, behavior, or effects. (Mitchell, 1996) With that
in mind, this study attempts to examine the relationships between the presence and types
of Public Authorities and the levels of aggregate debt in a selection of Kentucky's
prominent cities. It is important to note that, as much as I might like this study to
represent a microcosm of Authorities on a national or general level, this can in the end be
only a study of those Authorities specifically examined and the jurisdictions in which
they operate. In other words, this analysis of Kentucky cities should not necessarily be
used to make general assertions about authorities at large.
This is a study of the some of Commonwealth's most populous cities and the
special purpose entities that operate within their boundaries. The object of the study is to
examine the effects of certain factors, particularly the use of Public Authorities, on
aggregate debt in Kentucky's cities. As mentioned earlier, the statistical variable of
interest in this study, the dependent variable, is aggregate debt. Aggregate debt, as
reported by the local governments to the Governors Office for Local Development, is the
total of the outstanding, publicly held debt in the defined area. This includes all general
obligation municipal debt, as well as outstanding direct obligation municipal revenue
bonds and notes. This also includes the outstanding debt of all other public entities
operating in the area; like public parking corporations, river port authorities, housing
authorities, airports, and any other special districts. (GOLD, 2004)
The Independent variables in which this study is interested are those factors one
might reasonably believe to have a correlation with debt issuance. These variables
include statistics like population and assessed property value as well the activities of
Public Authorities. A number of the variables are economic indicators or demographic

32

statistics and a few have been designed by the author to help examine the activities of
Public Authorities. The table of statistics used in this analysis is displayed in its entirety
in appendix D.
Data collection for this study was conducted in a number of ways, beginning with
the independent research of literature and published studies. Some of the data for the
analysis were available through repositories like the US Census Bureau, the Kentucky
League of Cities, and the Governor's Office for Local Development, Commonwealth of
Kentucky. However, while I was able to obtain a number of the base statistics through
on-line and printed publications and information repositories, little of the data specifically
pertaining to Public Authorities was readily available. As will be discussed later in this
study, one of the most formidable problems associated with Public Authorities is that
they operate largely beyond the view of the public. These large organizations exist in
relative obscurity compared to their creator governments, yet they provide many of the
services most directly impacting the citizens on a daily basis.
However large, the separate status of the entities in which this study is particularly
interested means that the financial data are decentralized and sometimes difficult to
locate. In fact, the mere existence and numbers of the Authorities in each municipality
were more elusive than expected. Hence, the second phase of data collection consisted of
telephone and face to face interviews. Chief Financial Officers and Directors of Finance
of local governments were the primary targets of the initial interviews, although in larger
cities, administrators within Finance Departments tended to have more specific
information and were more available for interviews.
First, the interviewees were given an outline of the characteristics generally
applicable to Public Authorities. Some were already acutely aware of the terminology

33

while others required some explanation of the types of entities in which this study was
interested. Next, the government officials were asked to identify as many entities as
possible within their jurisdictions that may fit the general description, as prescribed
earlier in this study, of special purpose entities. From this list, the interviewees were then
asked to discuss any characteristics known of the entities, including purpose, structure,
financing activities, administrative activities, whether and when they must seek approval
from the creator governments for their activities, and any specific data they may have
available.
These were informal interviews and were conducted without a specific set of
questions, as different interviewees had different areas of expertise and access to different
types of information. The result of this round of informal interviews was a general
perspective of the types and scopes of entities operating in each area. In some cases,
these interviewees provided very detailed information regarding all the Public Authorities
in the jurisdiction. In most cases, however, much more investigation was necessary.
Finally, the interviewees were asked for a list of contacts within the local government
and, ideally, within the Public Authorities themselves.
For each city, the list of contacts was then explored to verify the information
given by local officials and to obtain more complete information directly from the Public
Authorities. Most of the information provided from separate sources seemed consistent
and the specific financial data and organizational characteristics provided a clearer
picture of the structures and activities of the Public Authorities.
As shown in Appendix D, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected for
this study. Quantitative statistics like population, property value, and aggregate debt
were obtained from published sources, while the general autonomy of Authorities in each
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city, the qualitative measure, was determined from the information provided by informal
interviews.
The study borrows from Eger's typology to characterize each Authority in terms
of administrative and financial autonomy. (Eger, 2000) Authorities were identified and
placed into sub-categories according to the criteria in Appendix B. Next, information
provided in the interviews was used to identify “autonomous Authorities” according to
the criteria in Appendix C. Note again that Authorities best described as special districts
were discarded from the study as separate types of entities that do not generally issue
debt. If any Authorities in a city were shown to be autonomous according to the model,
the city was then placed in the category of those cities having autonomous Authorities,
demonstrated by an entry of 1 in the field “Aut” in Appendix D. The data in Appendix D
were then subjected to statistical analyses to examine any correlations between the
proposed determinants of aggregate debt, or independent variables, and the dependent
variable aggregate debt per capita, as well as any differences of statistical significance
between those municipalities with autonomous Public Authorities and those without
autonomous Authorities.
Below are the enumerated steps used in this analysis:
1. A nonrandom sample was collected to represent municipalities in Kentucky with
constituent populations exceeding 18,000 residents.
2. Statistical data were gathered from published sources for use as independent variables.
3. Governments were contacted in the sample cities for interviews to identify Public
Authorities. Using criteria derived from literary research, particularly Eger, Mitchell,
and Leigland, combined with the information provided by interviewees, entities were
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identified as possible Public Authorities.
4. Those identified as possible Public Authorities were verified as such through further
research and grouped into categories per Appendix A and Appendix B. Special
districts were discarded, leaving public authorities and government corporations.
5. The remaining Authorities were then examined according to the criteria in Appendix
C for characteristics of administrative and financial autonomy.
6. From these criteria, the presence of “autonomous Authorities” was determined for
each city.
7. The data were entered into the table in Appendix D for use in statistical analyses to
examine the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent
variable aggregate debt, as well as any differences of statistical significance between
municipalities with autonomous Authorities and those without autonomous
Authorities.

Issues of validity
Internal Validity History is a significant threat to the internal validity of this model, as determinants
other than those identified herein as independent variables may act to affect the levels of
aggregate debt per capita in each of the cities. This threat is one that cannot be
eliminated but, rather, must be mitigated. In order to completely eliminate this threat,
this model would have to account for factors that cannot be identified, qualified, or
quantified. Moreover, to completely eliminate the history threat, this model would have
to account for all the possible determinants of aggregate debt, which could include
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constituent preferences, political motives and other variables that are difficult to pinpoint.
This threat to validity must be understood but it does not in itself detract significantly
from the model. It is not necessary to account for all the determinants of aggregate debt
in order to conceptualize the relationships between the variables in this study. More
specifically, we need not identify every determinant of aggregate debt in order to
understand the relationship between Public Authorities and aggregate debt. The hope
here is to include as many relevant variables as possible and simply concede that the
inability to include some variables such as constituent preferences is a threat to validity.
Selection is a second threat to the internal validity of this model, as it is
nonrandom. The population being examined in this study is Kentucky municipal
governments with constituent populations greater than 18, 000. While this is technically
a threat to the internal validity of the design, I do not think it will significantly affect the
analysis. I do not think there are any factors influencing my selection of this sample that
will have a discernible affect on the analysis.
There are two main types of threats to the internal validity of this model. The
history threat is one that cannot be avoided. One must simply be mindful of this threat
and view this model and the ensuing analysis in the context of that understanding. The
second threat is a selection threat. Again, it would have been possible to randomize the
selection of the sample from the population of municipal governments with over 18, 000
residents. However, I am unaware of any traits or characteristics that influenced my
selection of these governments for the sample. They were chosen arbitrarily, with no
prior knowledge of any of the data to be collected. Moreover, all of the governments
originally selected for the sample were included in the final analysis. For example, even
if the collection of data was abnormally difficult for a given municipal government, that
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government was not omitted from the study. Such serious selection threats were avoided,
at a substantial cost of time, to ensure the internal validity of this study.
If there is one specific result of the selection threat that stands out, it is that the
sample seems to represent the more widely known of Kentucky's cities. These are simply
the first cities that came to mind when thinking of a short list of Kentucky's larger
municipal governments. This, however, is still not a serious threat to the internal validity
of the model. It is, rather, something that must be pointed out and understood in order to
better grasp the purpose and results of this study.
External ValidityThe most substantial shortcomings of this model are threats to external validity.
There are two types of external validity threats at work in this model, one related to the
structure of the model and one related to the nature of the subjects.
Selection. The first threat that makes it difficult to generalize the results of this
model is similar to the selection problem that threatens its internal validity. With a
nonrandom sample, limited in size by time constraints, the selection threat is formidable.
While selection posed only a minor threat to internal validity, the threat to external
validity is sizable. It is possible that this analysis may be loosely generalizable within the
population of municipal governments from which this sample was taken. However,
selection threats seriously limit the extent to which this analysis may be generalized
outside this population.
Setting. This threat to external validity arises from the nature of the subjects
rather than the structure of the analysis. The ability to generalize this analysis outside the
selected population is severely limited by differences in locations and settings of
municipalities. As many scholars have explained, the uses and natures of Public
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Authorities vary between cities, states, and regions, largely without any discernible
patterns. In other words, our ability to generalize the results of this analysis outside the
selected population would be hampered by the effects of multiple settings. Different
states and regions have very different preferences with regard to Public Authorities and
debt issuance.
History is another threat to external validity that arises more from the nature of
the subjects rather than the structure of the analysis. Again, it is difficult to generalize
the results of this analysis beyond the sample and population when one considers the
myriad forces that may combine to affect levels of aggregate debt. Moreover, as those
authors cited in this study have noted, Public Authorities are difficult to classify or
characterize in general terms. As a result, with so many entities with such varying
characteristics, it is problematic to assume any generalizations regarding Public
Authorities beyond the samples and populations.
These threats have some effects on the context in which this study should be
viewed. The threats to the internal validity are minimal and should not have much of an
effect on the analysis. As mentioned, we must be mindful of the fact that other factors
not accounted for by this model may influence levels of aggregate debt. Furthermore, the
sample is small and nonrandom. Ideally, we would like to eliminate both of these threats
but, given the nature of the subject and the time constraints at hand, it is best to simply
keep them in mind throughout the analysis. They should be noticed but they are not
likely to seriously affect the results of the model.
The threats to the external validity are testament to the difficulty inherent in
generalizing such a model beyond the original population. The fact that the sample is
small and nonrandom combined with the affects of setting and history threats on the
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dependent variable make it unreasonable to assume generalization is possible. This could
be addressed, and the model strengthened, by increasing the size of and randomizing the
sample. However, time constraints on this study precluded such an effort. The effects of
setting and history could perhaps be mitigated by the introduction of new and complex
variables to account for differences in location and factors not currently explained by the
model. The addition of certain variables and the replication of the analysis in different
settings would likely strengthen the model. Again, however, these steps would have been
beyond the constraints of this analysis.
Even though the threats to external validity are formidable, they do not severely
damage this study. It would be ideal to develop models that could be generalized across
locations to deal with the many factors influencing Public Authorities and aggregate debt.
It would also be a monumental task. This model is not intended to describe the
relationship between the independent variables and aggregate debt on a national or even a
regional level. This study is one of Kentucky’s municipal governments. It should lend
insight into the nature of the relationships between the variables in Kentucky and could
perhaps even tempt us to draw some loose conclusions about Authorities and debt en
mass. However, the limitations placed on this study lead to threats to external validity
that preclude us from generalizing the results outside the chosen population. The study
however, may still tell us something about Kentucky’s municipalities and the variables
included herein. Moreover, it may give us a better of idea of what other steps are
necessary to better understand Public Authorities and the factors influencing aggregate
debt.
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Analysis and Results
The following section is a discussion of the empirical analyses used to test the
hypotheses that correlations exist between certain determinants of aggregate debt and the
levels of aggregate debt per capita in Kentucky's municipalities, as well as the hypothesis
that the presence of autonomous Authorities is associated with levels of aggregate debt
per capita in these municipalities.
Independent Variables
The following variables are those hypothesized to have some correlation with the
levels of aggregate debt in the sample municipalities.
Population Shift (PopShift)
There are some logical and intuitive conclusions that may be reached with a very
basic analysis of the data. First, looking at the percent change in population from 200 to
2003, it seems that there may be some sort of relationship between the variables. One
particular aspect stands out at first glance. The one municipal government that
experienced a decline in population over this period has the lowest aggregate debt per
capita by a considerable margin. This seems to support the theory that growth in
population has a positive correlation with aggregate debt. However, simply arranging the
data in ascending order of population growth and examining the levels of aggregate debt
suggests that other factors are certainly at play, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Paducah
Owensboro
Jefferson County
Fayette County
Bowling Green
Florence

-2.90%
0.45%
0.78%
2.41%
2.77%
4.83%

$834.95
$8,414.56
$3,706.18
$1,926.64
$1,852.51
$2,058.27

1
6
5
3
2
4

According to the data, there are several other factors at work in determining the

level of aggregate debt in a municipality. An inference that would be worth further
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exploration is the notion that perhaps, while population growth by itself may not be a
strong determinant of aggregate debt, a loss of population over a period may limit the
amount of debt a municipality is willing to issue. Perhaps while the growth is positive,
population shift is not a powerful determinant of aggregate debt but, when the population
begins to decrease, debt issuance is somewhat curtailed.
Population Density (Dens)
Density has been widely accepted by scholars as a significant determinant of debt
issuance. Theoretically, the more people per square mile the greater the need for
extensive and costly infrastructure projects. Moreover, urbanization often gives rise to
large housing authorities or other such debt-issuing entities that address the needs of
urban societies. If the data reflect this theory, we would see aggregate debt increasing
with population density. We can see in figure 2 that the data do not exactly follow that
theory but he overall trend does appear to be positive. In general, aggregate debt is
higher with the top three municipalities in population density than with the lower three.

Figure 2.1
Fayette County
Paducah
Bowling Green
Jefferson County
Florence
Owensboro

$915.60
$1,350.20
$1,392.30
$1,801.20
$2,379.00
$3,102.90

$1,926.64
$834.95
$1,852.51
$3,706.18
$2,058.27
$8,414.56

3
1
2
5
4
6

Furthermore, before dismissing this theory we should consider that one of
the municipalities, Fayette Co., is a merged city-county government and that Jefferson Co
is a county government just prior to merger (used as the closest possible approximation to
the merged Louisville Metro Government). This means that the population density of the
municipality is decreased by the addition of some sparsely populated, outlying areas. It is
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possible that Figure 2 is skewed slightly by comparing purely city governments and
merged governments. To examine this notion, Fayette Co. was removed and the City of
Louisville was substituted for Jefferson County to derive Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2
Paducah
Bowling Green
Florence
Owensboro
Louisville

$1,350.20
$1,392.30
$2,379.00
$3,102.90
$4,124.90

$834.95
$1,852.51
$2,058.27
$8,414.56
$1948.48

1
2
4
5
3

This still does not provide a linear correlation between the variables but some
relationship seems evident. It is quite possible that the difficulty in comparing merged
and traditional governments in this respect is too difficult a task with such a small
sample. We might find with a larger sample that there is a linear or curvilinear, positive
correlation between density and aggregate debt. Even this small dataset seems to suggest
some trend of the like.
Property Value per Capita (PropVal)
Intuitively, one might expect that the assessed property value per capita of a
municipality might have an inverse correlation with aggregate debt, or that as value
increases, revenue would increase and the need to issue debt would decrease. Figure 3
illustrates the relationship between these variables without controlling for other factors.

Figure 3
Bowling Green
Owensboro
Paducah
Jefferson County
Fayette County
Florence

$14,539.89
$37,836.58
$43,921.00
$51,631.05
$62,762.20
$72,987.29

$1,852.51
$8,414.56
$834.95
$3,706.18
$1,926.64
$2,058.27

2
6
1
5
3
4
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The relationship between assessed property value per capita and aggregate debt
shown appears to be random. While it is hard to draw conclusions from a small sample,
there does not seem to any significant interaction between these variables and perhaps
property value is not a useful determinant of aggregate debt. Since there does not appear
to be any correlation at first glance and since property value is accounted for in tax
revenue, another independent variable in this study, property value per capita does not
appear to be a useful determinant of aggregate debt.
Tax Revenue per Capita (TaxRev)
Like property value per capita, one might expect tax revenue per capita to
correlate negatively with aggregate debt. This notion assumes that a municipal
government collecting greater revenues per capita could rely more on pay as you go
(paygo) funding and slightly less on debt financing. Figure 4 displays the relationship
between tax revenue and aggregate debt per capita without controlling for other variables.

Figure 4
Owensboro
Jefferson County
Florence
Bowling Green
Paducah
Fayette County

$396
$515
$577
$623
$718
$737

$8,414.56
$3,706.18
$2,058.27
$1,852.51
$834.95
$1,926.64

6
5
4
2
1
3

Here it looks as though there is a negative correlation between tax revenue and
aggregate debt per capita, even with a small sample. Even though the data do not
demonstrate a perfectly linear correlation, they do suggest that the hypothesis that
revenue and aggregate debt are negatively correlated is plausible. Further analysis will
examine this relationship.
Intergovernmental Revenue as a Percent of Total Revenue (InterRev)
Intergovernmental revenue as a percent of total revenue is another possible
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indicator of the level of aggregate debt held in a municipality. The assumption here
would be that those municipalities that rely heavily upon intergovernmental aid would be
the same that incur large amounts of aggregate debt. This would not represent a causal
relationship but might nevertheless correlate with debt issuance. The percentages of
intergovernmental revenue are displayed in figure 5, along with the levels and ranks of
aggregate debt per capita in the sample municipalities.

Figure 5
Florence

6.68%

$2,058.27

4

Paducah

12.2%

$834.95

1

Bowling Green

14.36%

$1,852.51

2

Fayette Co

15.81%

$1,926.64

3

Owensboro

20.07%

$8,414.56

6

Jefferson Co

23.39%

$3,706.18

5

According to the data, there does not appear to be a linear relationship between
these two variables. However, as those with high percentages of intergovernmental
revenue tend to have higher aggregate debt in general, this variable as a determinant of
debt will be revisited in further analysis.
Presence of Autonomous Authorities (Aut)
Figure 7 illustrates those municipalities identified as having autonomous Public
Authorities and those who do not, per Appendix D, as well as the amounts and ranks of
aggregate debt per capita. If the hypothesis that autonomous Authorities are associated
with higher aggregate debt per capita is true, we would expect to see a positive
correlation between the variables.
Figure 7
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Fayette Co

0

$1,926.64

3

Florence

0

$2,058.27

4

Paducah

1

$834.95

1

Bowling Green

1

$1,852.51

2

Jefferson Co

1

$3,706.18

5

Owensboro

1

$8,414.56

6

Based on the data, there does not appear to be any correlation between the two
variables. To substantiate this initial perception any possible relationship between the
two will be more closely examined in the subsequent analyses.
Through basic interpretation of the data obtained, we can see that a few variables
seem to have some correlation with aggregate debt in the selected municipalities. The
following section further examines these possible relationships using statistical methods.

Statistical Analysis
Correlation Coefficients
First, in order to examine the basic correlations between the variables, the
coefficients of correlation were determined and are shown below.
Aggregate Debt
AggDebt

1.0000

AuthDebt

0.1585

Aut

0.3213

InterRev

0.5789

TaxRev

-0.8889
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PropVal

-0.1567

Dens

0.8106

PopShift

-0.0596

The primary variable of interest in this study, the presence of autonomous
Authorities (Aut), has a relatively weak positive correlation with the dependent variable
aggregate debt (AggDebt). According to the data, there is little correlation between the
presence of autonomous Authorities, as defined by the study, and the levels of aggregate
debt in the sample cities. This does not necessarily mean that no relationship exists but
the data do not seem to support such a correlation.
Tax Revenue Per Capita (TaxRev), on the other hand, appears to have a strong
negative correlation with aggregate debt. The data here support the theory that an
increase in tax revenue per capita corresponds to a decrease in aggregate debt. It is
possible that municipalities with higher tax revenue per capita rely less on debt financing
than their counterparts with lower per capita revenues.
As hypothesized, population density (Dens) has a relatively strong positive
correlation with aggregate debt. Though .8106 is far from a perfect correlation, it is a
substantial correlation. The data support the theory that densely populated areas will
have a higher level of aggregate debt per capita than sparsely populated areas. As
mentioned earlier, this is likely due to the special public needs arising from urbanization
such as dense and extensive infrastructure.
Intergovernmental revenue as a percent of total revenue (InterRev) has a weaker
positive correlation with aggregate debt with a coefficient of .5789. This correlation is
not causal but, more likely, arises from municipalities turning to both intergovernmental
aid and debt financing to compensate for a lack of available funds. In other words, a
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municipality with relatively little available funding may turn to debt financing and
qualify for intergovernmental aid to a greater extent than those with greater available
funds. It seems logical that InterRev and AggDebt would be correlated, as municipalities
rely on both for the same reasons. The coefficient is, however, not as strong as expected.
This may be attributable to the small sample size, as intergovernmental revenue is
generally an accepted indicator of levels of municipal debt.
The correlation coefficients displayed above support the hypotheses that tax
revenue per capita, population density, and to a lesser extent, intergovernmental revenue
as a percent of total revenue have some correlation with aggregate debt. However, the
rest of the variables hypothesized to correlate with aggregate debt have relatively weak
associations with the dependent variable. This may be due in some part to the small
sample size and or the threats to internal validity discussed later. In other words, this
does not mean we should rule out these variables as determinants of aggregate debt.
However, the data only support the hypotheses that tax revenue per capita and population
density are accurate determinants of aggregate debt.
Regression
To further analyze the relationships between the independent and dependent
variables in this study, those variables for which the initial analysis suggested a
correlation were subjected to simple regression analyses. First, tax revenue per capita
was found in the initial analysis to correlate negatively with aggregate debt. To further
examine this association, the following regression model was used:

Yi = β0 + β1Xi + εi
Where:
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Yi = Aggregate debt per capita (AggDebt) for the population of Kentucky cities
β0 = Slope for AggDebt for Kentucky cities
β1 = Slope for TaxRev for Kentucky cities
Xi = Tax Revenue Per Capita (TaxRev) for the population of Kentucky cities
εi = Random error in Y for observation i
The regression model was intended to determine the association between the
independent variable tax revenue per capita and the dependent variable aggregate debt
(AggDebt) at the .05 level of confidence and n = 6. A simple regression model was
chosen in light of the sample size which, due to time constraints, was insufficient for a
more complex multivariate regression analysis. The analysis determined that tax revenue
per capita has a statistically significant negative correlation with aggregate debt per capita
at the .05 level of significance, with a t value for (TaxRev) of -3.88 and p = .018. The
analysis produced a regression coefficient of -19.02151 for TaxRev, meaning that for
each increase in one dollar of tax revenue per capita, the aggregate debt of the
municipality is predicted to decrease by $19.02. This is a significant finding confirming
the hypothesis that tax revenue per capita has a negative correlation with aggregate debt
per capita. As hypothesized, it is likely that those municipalities with higher revenues per
capita are less inclined to finance the provision of public goods through the issuance of
debt than those with lower per capita revenues.
To test the association between population density and aggregate debt, a similar
regression model was constructed as follows:

Yi = β0 + β1Xi + εi
Where:
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Yi = Aggregate debt per capita (AggDebt) for the population of Kentucky cities
β0 = Slope for AggDebt for Kentucky cities
β1 = Slope for Dens of Kentucky cities
Xi = Population density per square mile (Dens) for the population of Kentucky cities
εi = Random error in Y for observation i
This model was intended to examine the association between density and
aggregate debt per capita at the .05 level (95% confidence) where n = 6. The results of
this model confirm the likelihood of a positive correlation between the independent
variable (Dens) and the dependent variable (AggDebt) with a Dens t-statistic of 2.77 and
a p value of .05. The regression coefficient for Dens in the model is 2.79309, which
predicts that each additional person per square mile will correlate with an additional
$2.79 of aggregate debt in the municipality. Thus, the hypothesis that a positive
correlation exists between population density and aggregate debt per capita in Kentucky's
cities is confirmed by the model. This makes logical sense, as mentioned earlier, that
municipalities with dense populations would have a greater need for expensive
infrastructure projects and urban programs. However, we must take caution in
generalizing the results shown here. The p value is probably acceptable for this model
but only by a tiny margin. Moreover, such a small sample precludes us from accurate
generalization.
Since the two simple regression models confirmed the theories that correlations
exist between both TaxRev and Dens and aggregate debt, a multivariate analysis was
attempted to further evaluate the associations. This was done with the understanding that
n = 6 may have been too small for an effective model of this type. Nevertheless, it was a
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notion worth attention. For this model

Yi = β0 + β1Xi + β2X2 + εi
Where:
Yi = Aggregate debt per capita (AggDebt) for the population of Kentucky cities
β0 = Slope for AggDebt for Kentucky cities
β1 = Slope for TaxRev for Kentucky cities
Xi = Tax Revenue Per Capita (TaxRev) for the population of Kentucky cities

β2 = Slope for Dens of Kentucky cities
X2 = Population density per square mile (Dens) for the population of Kentucky cities
εi = Random error in Y for observation i
This model was devised to simultaneously evaluate the associations between the
two independent variables (TaxRev and Dens) and the dependent variable aggregate debt
per capita (AggDebt) in Kentucky's cities. As before, this model was constructed at the
.05 level of confidence with n = 6. However, the results of this analysis did not support
the model as a good fit. The t-values for Tax Rev and Dens were low, at -1.38 and .07
respectively. Moreover, the p values for each variable were significantly higher in the
combined model, at .261 for TaxRev and .947 for Dens. For the data in this study, with a
small sample, the multivariate regression model was not a good fit and neither
independent variable was statistically significant.
Analysis of Autonomous Authorities
Even though the dichotomous variable constructed to represent the presence of
autonomous Public Authorities or special purpose entities did not yield a positive
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coefficient sufficient to support the hypothesis of correlation between the variable and
aggregate debt per capita, other empirical analyses were pursued to verify the findings.
First, the data were subjected to a t-test for differences in the means of two
groups. The six municipalities in the sample were divided into two samples to represent
two separate populations of Kentucky's cities, those with autonomous Public Authorities
and those without. This was a simple matter of placing those municipalities with a value
of 0 in the Aut row of Appendix D into group one, representing those without
autonomous Authorities, and those municipalities with a value of 1 in the Aut row of
Appendix D into group two, representing municipalities with autonomous Authorities.
This analysis was conducted to test for differences between the mean aggregate
debts per capita of the two groups with the hypotheses:
H0 : µ1 ≥ µ2 or µ1 - µ2 ≥0
H1 : µ1 < µ2 or µ1 – µ2 < 0
A one tailed test was used to test the alternative hypothesis that the mean of group
one was less than the mean of group two, or that municipalities with autonomous Public
Authorities will have a higher aggregate debt per capita than those without autonomous
Authorities. For this test, group one n = 2 and group two n = 4 with four degrees of
freedom and assuming equal variances.
The results of this analysis were not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis, with a
t-statistic of -.68 and a p value for the one tailed test of .27. This means that there is not
sufficient evidence that the presence of autonomous Public Authorities results in an
increase in aggregate debt per capita. According to the data obtained in this study, there
is no significant difference in the mean aggregate debts of municipalities with
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autonomous Authorities and those without autonomous Authorities.
To substantiate this conclusion, one final empirical analysis was conducted; a
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for differences between two medians. For this analysis, the
two groups were identical to those used in the t-test described earlier and used to test the
hypotheses
H0 : M1 ≥ M2
H1 : M1 < M2
The test was designed to determine if sufficient evidence exists that those
municipalities with autonomous Authorities have higher median aggregate debts per
capita than those without autonomous Authorities. In order to perform this test, the
observations in each group are assigned ranks based upon values of aggregate debt per
capita with total sample size n = 6. The analysis yielded a T1 test statistic of 5 and a Z
test statistic of -0.93. For the upper tail test, the critical value is 1.65 and the p value is
.82. Thus, we must not reject the null hypothesis. The results of this analysis do not
provide sufficient evidence that the median aggregate debts per capita are higher in
municipalities with autonomous Authorities than in those without such Authorities.
Aggregate Debt Compositions
To further examine the use of Public Authorities in Kentucky, it is useful to take a
closer look at the compositions of the aggregate debts in each municipality. The
following figures demonstrate the amount of the aggregate debt in each municipality and
the portions of the aggregate directly issued by municipal governments (either revenue or
general obligation) as well as those portions issued by Authorities. The statistics were
derived from the 2003 debt report from the Kentucky Governor's Office for local
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development, comprehensive annual financial reports, and direct interviews with
administrators. The figures below demonstrate how much variation can exist in the use
of Public Authorities from one government to another.
Municipality

Municipal Debt

Authority Debt

Aggregate Debt

Authority Debt/Aggregate

Bowling Green

$81,271,903

$12,581,671

$93,853,574

13.4%

Florence

$36,943,333

$13,873,334

$50,816,667

27.3%

Fayette Co.

$502,885,753

$11,139,047

$514,024,800

2.1%

Jefferson Co.

$389,639,000

$2,201,040,391

$2,590,679,391

84.9%

Owensboro

$60,901,234

$396,110,601

$457,011,835

86.7%

Paducah

$10,289,505

$11,056,046

$21,345,551

51.8%

It is important to mention again at this point that these figures are not reported by
the local governments. You will not find these numbers anywhere on the government's
financial reports nor will you find them on file with state offices. The municipal
governments report their debts on their annual financial reports and sometimes include
Public Authorities as component units. Other times they do not include Authorities at all.
The Governor's Office for Local Development releases an annual report of local debt
statistics as well. However, like the local governments, the state report does not
differentiate between direct municipal obligations and Public Authority obligations. The
report does account for public corporations according to the U.S. Census definition but
that definition does not encompass all special purpose governments.
For these figures, the study used the complete listing of outstanding obligations
for each government and determined on an individual basis, according to the definition of
Public Authorities herein, which issues were municipal and which were obligations of
special purpose entities. As a result of this interpretation, the exact figures are certainly
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debatable. However, when one considers the enormous disparity between the
percentages of Authority debt in each municipality shown above, the point remains clear.
There is a great deal of variation in the debt issuance of Public Authorities across the
municipal governments of Kentucky.
We can draw a few other conclusions from this information. First, qualitative
variables such as political climates, administrative preferences, and constituent
preferences may have as much to do with the debt issuance of local governments as the
determinants used in this study. Not only is there a great deal of variation in the amounts
of the aggregate debts per capita across the municipalities, but the compositions of the
aggregates vary tremendously. This is likely in large part a result of the individual
preferences of the cities. Some local governments, like in Fayette County, clearly prefer
to more directly control the provision public services and, by extension, the issuance of
debt. On the other hand, Jefferson County and Owensboro seem to prefer the creation of
separate Authorities as a means to provide services and issue debt. In fact, this notion
was confirmed in interviews with Fayette County administrators, who explained that
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government simply has never relied that heavily upon
Authorities. The simplicity of the statement demonstrates how much precedent and
political-administrative preferences can weigh-in on a government's decisions regarding
service provision and financing.
Perhaps the most apparent conclusion to be drawn from the collection of this data
is the imperfection and lack of transparency of information in Kentucky's local
governments. As mentioned earlier, the single most substantial obstacle to this study was
that information is simply not readily available. The acquisition of the data in this study
required a great deal of time, persistence, and most importantly, interpretation. As a

55

result, ten different observers might derive ten different sets of figures from the financial
information available. The local governments in this study do not adequately, if at all,
report the existence or activities of Public Authorities in their jurisdictions. The debt
levels they report in their financial reports do not reflect the total levels of publicly held
debt in the municipalities. In some cases, they do not even come close.
This is not to say that the governments in this study are intentionally concealing
debt. It is nothing so sinister. The fact is, each government has an accounting and
reporting system and, while they are quite uniform, differences clearly exist with regard
to the reporting of Public Authorities. While this is not a catastrophic problem, it is still a
problem. When the activities of a group of entities that issue at least 80% of the public
debt in a jurisdiction are not reported, there is clearly a lack of transparency and the
public remains in the dark with regard to the activities of entities that provide some of
their most vital public services.

Conclusions
The analysis of the data collected for this study offers us some insight into the
relationship between Public Authorities and aggregate debt, as well as other factors that
influence aggregate debt levels in Kentucky's municipalities. First, we may conclude that
there is a significant negative correlation between tax revenue per capita and aggregate
debt per capita. The data show us that increases in the former correspond to a decrease in
the latter. This may or may not indicate a causal relationship and further analysis would
be necessary to substantiate such a claim. What can be said, however, is that tax revenue
per capita is at least in some way linked to aggregate debt in Kentucky's municipalities.
Logically, or at least intuitively, we might conclude that governments with higher per
56

capita tax revenues might not rely as heavily on debt financing as do governments with
lower tax revenues. The results of the analysis support this notion.
Another extension of this conclusion, though not as simple, may follow from the
supposition that municipalities having higher tax revenues per capita may have so in part
because of more affluent residents. Supposing this, it might follow that a municipality
with relatively affluent residents may contain private firms that provide some of the
goods often provided by Public Authorities or other such entities that contribute to levels
of aggregate debt. To illustrate this notion, suppose City A is a suburb made up of
residents with relatively high individual incomes. This per capita income provides a
market for the private provision of goods or services, such as health care, that might be
publicly provided in a less affluent city. Such public provision of goods is often
facilitated by debt financing through vehicles other than traditional governments, which
contribute to higher aggregate debt.
If this is the case, tax revenue per capita may have a multifaceted correlation with
aggregate debt. In other words, tax revenue may be associated with aggregate debt in
that 1) higher revenues precipitate less reliance on debt financing 2) higher tax revenues
per capita often result from higher per capita incomes and these incomes produce markets
in which the private provision of goods reduce the reliance upon public provision, in
effect reducing the need for projects requiring debt financing. Such extensions to the
association between tax revenue and aggregate debt may be numerous and are well
beyond the scope of this study. This is just an illustration demonstrating that the data
support the theory that tax revenue per capita is negatively correlated with aggregate debt
in Kentucky's cities but that further analysis would be necessary to determine whether or
not this relationship is causal.
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The practical conclusions here are logical enough and likely apply to the
population of Kentucky's municipalities. As high per capita aggregate debt is never
desirable, although sometimes a necessary consequence of public/social improvements,
Kentucky's municipalities should consider the idea that tax revenue is tied to aggregate in
several ways. It seems commonsensical to postulate that increasing tax revenue will
reduce the reliance upon debt financing. However, municipalities might find that
exploration of the association between tax revenue and aggregate debt would yield more
complex conclusions that may aid them in understanding the nature and causes of
accelerated aggregate debt.
In addition to substantiating tax revenue per capita as a determinant of aggregate
debt per capita, the data support the theory, although to a lesser extent, that population
density is positively correlated to aggregate debt. Although the data do not provide as
strong or statistically significant evidence of this correlation as for that correlation
between tax revenue and debt, some correlation is evident and precedent compliments
and bolsters the findings. Other studies have identified population density as an effective
determinant of municipal debt and, by extension, aggregate debt. The analysis of the data
here tends to support prior findings. Though marginally so, the results of the model
examining the correlation between density and aggregate debt are statistically significant.
Even though the results of the analysis are not as powerful as one might expect, likely
due in some part to the aforementioned problem of the sample size in a regression
analysis, when combined with what we have learned from other studies about the
association density and debt, it is likely that these results can be applied to the population
of Kentucky municipalities. Again, this may be presumptuous, based upon the sample
size, but when one considers the precedent of density as a determinant of debt and the
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logical sense of the argument, I am prepared to stipulate that this also applies in
Kentucky.
As with the findings regarding the previous variable, the practical implications of
these results focus primarily on understanding aggregate debt. It may be useful for a
municipality and its constituents to understand that population density is positively
correlated with aggregate debt and view its own levels of outstanding debt in that context.
For example, when evaluating the financial management of a municipal government, it
may be useful to remember that research suggests that high density areas incur more debt
than sparsely populated ones. This is not to say that densely populated areas cannot
avoid accelerated debt issuance. In fact, the very understanding of this trend may help
governments examine what activities, programs, or entities are contributing to high or
undesirable levels of aggregate debt and determine how to curtail the rate of issuance. A
municipality cannot likely control what it does not understand, especially in a case like
aggregate debt, where issuance is decentralized and obligation is ambiguous.
Understanding the factors that affect or seem to affect aggregate debt, like population
density, is instrumental in monitoring and controlling issuance.
The hypothesized determinant of aggregate debt of principal interest to this study
is the presence of autonomous Public Authorities or special purpose entities. The main
goal of this study was to address the role of Public Authorities or special purpose entities
in determining the aggregate debt of a municipality. Specifically, this study was aimed at
determining whether the use of autonomous Public Authorities seemed to lead to
increased levels of aggregate debt. Early on, this study discussed the two sides of the
argument over the use of Public Authorities. Those who support Authorities as purveyors
of goods argue that their independence and expertise make them ideal for certain
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missions. Critics argue that Authorities are primarily vehicles used to circumvent debt
limitations and that they can be subject to mismanagement, especially financially, in
which case their autonomy may lead to undesirable levels of debt issuance. The primary
goal of this study was to determine if evidence exists to support the theory that
Authorities with great degrees of autonomy take advantage of this freedom to issue more
debt. The logic here is that, if relatively autonomous Authorities are issuing larger
volumes of debt in Kentucky's municipalities, the aggregate debts per capita of
municipalities with autonomous Authorities would generally exceed those of their
counterparts who tightly control the activities of their Authorities. In short, this study
attempted to discern whether those Authorities with the freedom to issue debt with
relative impunity are doing so in Kentucky's cities and, by extension, endangering the
financial positions of their creator governments.
In order to accomplish this task, this study included several test to examine the
relationship between the presence of autonomous Authorities and aggregate debt per
capita. First, Public Authorities were identified and categorized and those municipalities
granting autonomy to its Authorities, per Appendix C, were identified. According to the
data obtained four of the six municipalities sampled utilized autonomous Authorities and
two did not. Upon first analysis, there appeared to be little relationship between the
presence of such Authorities and aggregate debt. There was no immediately evident
trend demonstrating higher aggregate debts per capita in those municipalities with
autonomous Authorities than those without.
To test the correlation between the presence of autonomous Authorities and
aggregate debt, the correlation coefficients were determined. This method produced no
evidence of correlation between the variables and thus, we could not conclude that any
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association exists between the two. To further examine the possibility of association, a ttest was performed to determine if the presence of autonomous Authorities correlates
with a difference in the average levels of aggregate debt per capita in the municipalities.
As before, there was no evidence suggesting that such a relationship exists. Finally, the
same data were subjected to a Wilcoxon rank sum test to search for evidence that
municipalities with the Authorities were incurring higher levels of aggregate debt per
capita than those without such Authorities. Again, no evidence of significance was found
to support this theory.
Despite a few drawbacks, these analyses tell us a few important things about
Public Authorities and aggregate debt. First, there is no evidence in the data that
autonomous Authorities, as defined by this study, are leading to increased debt issuance
in Kentucky's cities. If the data are accurate and generally representative of Kentucky's
municipalities, this seems to support the proponents of Public Authorities. At the very
least, the study supports proponents of Authorities by default, in that it provides no
evidence that their use is leading to increased debt issuance. This does not conclusively
mean that Authorities with relatively high degrees of autonomy are harmless or that
critics of Authorities are unfounded. Critics of Authorities can always argue the potential
for financial mismanagement. However, this study does not provide critics any
ammunition for their assault on Authorities. In other words, autonomous Authorities, by
their definition, have the potential to issue undesirable amounts of debt and thus affect
the financial position of their creator governments. According to the data collected from
Kentucky's municipalities, however, they do not appear to be doing so.
Public Authorities or special purpose entities are sometimes used to avoid the
direct obligation of debt or circumvent debt limitations and some scholars have
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concluded that they are largely created for financial rather than administrative motives.
(Leigland, 1994) However, there is no evidence here that those municipalities granting
high degrees of freedom to their Authorities are incurring higher levels of aggregate debt.
It is quite possible that the disparities in the levels of aggregate debt are the result
of several variables that can be measured, such as tax revenue and population density,
and several variables that cannot be quantified. It is likely that one of the most important
determinants of aggregate debt falls into the latter category. Some municipalities, such as
Paducah, simply choose to avoid debt as part of their standard procedures or political
choices. On the other hand, cities such as Owensboro are apparently much more
comfortable with large amounts of Authority debt. It is worthwhile to note again that in
cases such as Owensboro, the city does not have an abnormally high amount of general
obligation debt outstanding. (See Appendix D) It just has a large amount of revenue and
Authority debt. This demonstrates that some cities, while they may not be dangerously
encumbering future revenue with general obligation debt service, are not bashful about
the use of revenue debt, particularly when using Authorities as a vehicle. In other words,
it is probable that much of the difference between the levels of aggregate debt in the
municipalities results from debt-averse political climates and matters of constituent
preference.
While there are numerous limitations to this study, as discussed earlier, it does
demonstrate a lack of correlation between autonomous Authorities and aggregate debt.
Moreover, it confirmed two possible determinants of aggregate debt in tax revenue, with
a negative correlation and population density, with a positive correlation. With respect to
the use of Public Authorities, there is no evidence here that Kentucky's municipalities
need to take any new measures to control debt issuance. It seems that the controls and
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limitations built into the charters of Authorities, even those with relative freedom of
financial management, combined perhaps with the professionalism of directors and
leaders is containing debt issuance.
In order to further examine the relationships between these variables and perhaps
verify the findings of this study, it would be necessary to first expand the sample size of
municipalities to make the analysis more generalizable. If this was done, we could
further explore the subject matter of this study with a multivariate regression model to
examine the hypothesized determinants of aggregate debt. If time and resource
constraints permitted, a regression model with a larger sample might substantiate the
results of this study. Perhaps the model
Y = I + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4+ E
Where:
Y = Aggregate Debt per Capita
I = Intercept
X1 = Population Density (per square mile)
X2 = Tax Revenue Per Capita
X3 = Intergovernmental Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue
X4 = Presence of Autonomous Authorities (Dichotomous Variable)
E = Standard Error
or something of the like might provide us with a better understanding of the association
between Public Authorities, as well as other hypothesized determinants, and aggregate
debt.
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One of the most important conclusions reached in this study concerns the
information regarding Public Authorities in Kentucky. It seems that these entities exist in
relative obscurity among the population of the Commonwealth's governmental bodies.
Creator governments in far too many cases have little knowledge or understanding of the
specific activities of Authorities. Even if control is relinquished considerably to
Authorities, it may be wise to maintain some degree of surveillance. This would allow
for two desirable results. First, if the creator government is explicitly aware of the
activities of its Authorities, it may be able to discourage or correct activities it deems
detrimental to its own financial position. Moreover, if it maintains awareness of the
activities of its Authorities, it may be able to learn from these activities and refine its
future use of special purpose entities.
The second main advantage of maintaining at least some level of surveillance
over Authorities is to provide for better transparency for constituents. Authorities
provide some of the most visible services to residents, yet the nature of their
administrative and financial activities remains obscured from public view. There are no
repositories for this information and its location and collection is tedious. As result,
constituents in a democratic process often have little knowledge of the activities of
governmental entities that provide some of their most vital services.
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